Macedonia - Kosovo - Serbia Axis: a Hidden Crisis

 AXIS INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, 3.05.2006 By Can Karpat, AIA Balkan Section

 

Albanian Party in Macedonia promotes the "Almakos" project, a Benelux-like trade union, which would unite Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. Serbian Radical Party already announced the opening of a branch in Macedonia. The Macedonian Orthodox Church and Serbian Orthodox Church are still far from making peace. And now the Macedonian government decided to negotiate the border issue with Pristina - despite Belgrade. Will Skopje risk its good relations with Belgrade for the sake of upcoming elections...

 

Electoral cacophony in Macedonia

 

The electoral heat has already embraced Macedonia. Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) promotes the "Almakos" project, a sort of Balkan Benelux, which will unite Albania, Macedonia and, if independent, Kosovo. Almakos is an acronym formed from the first syllables of these countries' names.

 

In the framework of the border dispute and Kosovo negotiations, Almakos raises doubts whether the project in question is as innocent as it seems. PDP President Abdulhadi Vejseli assures that this is supposed to be just a trade union: "We have promoted the idea for the creating of a trade union between Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. This is a union for education, culture and science between the three countries because the investments in a union comprising 8 or 10 million are much more palpable for the foreign investors than a country of 2 million, and that is why it is good for this idea of ours to be debated by those who know how to analyse and think properly".

 

The Almakos project will be the central point of PDP's electoral campaign. Some Macedonian analysts see behind the Almakos Union a hidden "Greater Albania" scheme. However the fact that the other two Albanian parties in Macedonia, Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) reject the idea weakens this claim. It is known that the autonomist DPA and the moderate PDP are bitter rivals. DPA considers the Almakos proposal as PDP's "pre-election marketing". According to the Macedonian Institute for Sociologic, Juridical Research's poll conducted in April, PDP is one of the last options for many voters in July elections. Almakos is just a political propaganda tool for PDP.

 

PDP is not the one, which contributes to the general electoral cacophony in Macedonia. After the visit of Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku to Skopje, Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski stated the "administrative border" between Macedonia and Kosovo must be confirmed as a "state border" by experts from both sides at a more appropriate moment. However Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski stressed that there is nothing to negotiate, for the northern border of Macedonia is already a "state border" and recognised as such by the international community.

 

Buckovski's Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) is one of the favourites in the upcoming elections. Obviously SDSM winks at the Albanian minority in Macedonia, which makes up no less than 19.2 of the population. It is known that neither Kosovo Albanians nor Macedonian Albanians are satisfied with the Serbia-Macedonia border demarcation agreement of 2001. It is also true that many Macedonians still consider the northern border as a potential threat for country's stability. If Buckovski can fix the border, this will be a precious point for his party.

 

This picture gives the impression that the Macedonian government favours Pristina rather than Belgrade. Belgrade highly disapproves that Skopje discusses the border issue with Pristina. While Crvenkovski himself warns that Macedonia should keep the balance right with both Serbia and Kosovo, Buckovski's ambiguous handling of the situation may play into the hands of Macedonian nationalists, who are sceptical towards the Kosovo question and Albanians in general.

 

Macedonian Quislings?

 

Amongst the "three wolves" of the Macedonian question, namely Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, Macedonia is at the best terms with the latter. The two countries have good diplomatic and economic relations.

 

Yet, there is one problem, which comes up to the surface every now and then: the question of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. In 1959, in order to underscore the Macedonian ethnic individuality, Belgrade forced the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) to accept the existence of a Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). In 1967, MOC declared itself autocephalous and separated from SOC. Until the end of communism, MOC enjoyed a more favoured position than any other churches in Yugoslavia. Yet immediately after the collapse of communism, SOC, arguing that it had been forced by anti-canonical methods (communist pressure) to accept MOC, entered in a bitter conflict with the latter. MOC's self-proclaimed autocephaly is not officially recognised by other Orthodox churches still today.

 

Is it just a question of church? Is MOC really schismatic, or do other Orthodox Churches use religion as a political tool? After all, there is still a big debate over the authenticity of the Macedonian nationality. Many Macedonians consider the non-recognition of their church as the non-recognition of their nation. Macedonia's quest for independence and security has long been linked to the cause of an independent church. Archbishopric of Ohrid, SOC's embattled autonomous branch in Macedonia, is often seen as "house of Serbian conspiracy". Archbishop Jovan was sentenced to 18-month of imprisonment in July 2005 on charges of "inciting national, racial and religious hatred, schism and intolerance". After spending 220 days in the central prison of Idrizovo in Skopje, he was released in March this year. Archbishop Jovan was a bishop of MOC before he quitted in 2002 to join the Serbs, who appointed him as Archbishop of Ohrid under the tutelage of the Patriarchate of Pec (SOC's centre in Pec, Kosovo). Because he is not a Serb, but a Macedonian, the Macedonian side has always regarded him as a "Serbian Quisling".

 

There are some 35.000 Serbs living in Macedonia, mainly in the northern region of the country (2002 est.). The Serbian Orthodox community and their church are refused registration. Archbishop Jovan insists that the Macedonian religious law must be changed. Although all of its clergy are Macedonians, the Archbishopric has little support from the Orthodox Macedonians, which largely prefers MOC.

 

Last April, Serbian Radical Party (SRS) announced the opening of a branch in Macedonia. Radical Party of Serbs in Macedonia tries to obtain registration. Some link the Radicals' drive for registration with the church rows between SOC and MOC. According to Dragan Nikolic, a publisher, "The [Serb] Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese and the emerging Radical party are part of the same project, only with actors wearing different clothes", adding that "the establishment of a [SRS] branch in another country objectively means they do not recognise this country. If nothing else, it means they have aspirations towards Macedonia".

 

As early as 1991, SRS leader Vojislav Seselj declared that "Macedonia has always been the Serb territory. Macedonians, Muslims and Montenegrins are fictitious nations". Is then another Quisling on the way?

 

There are many ethnic Serbian parties in Macedonia. The main Serbian party is Ivan Stoiljkovic's Democratic Party of Serbs (DPS), which is also part of the ruling coalition. Local Serbs, though, are not satisfied with DPS' work. The small size of the Serbian minority and their difficult relations with the Albanian minority put the former in a difficult position. Yet, Macedonia's Serbs had never a history of rebellion against the Macedonian government, except for the period of the Kosovo War when the Serbs accused the government of being pro-Albanian. That is why Ferid Muhic, professor of philosophy at Skopje University warns that "parties that held fascistic or hard-line racist ideologies could always find ways to stir up confrontation and uproar. At a time when the decision on the final status of Kosovo is approaching, one cannot rule out this scenario".

 

Macedonian Radicals freely admit regular contacts with SRS and do not hide the fact that they have organised rallies of Serbs from Macedonia in Serbia in support of Vojislav Seselj, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic.

 

For a minority, which makes up only 1.78 percent of a country's population, the current number of ethnic-based Serbian parties is already too much. Yet, in the current context of upcoming elections in Macedonia, border dispute, religious question and Kosovo negotiations, any radicalisation of the Serbian electorate in Macedonia can play into the hands of the Radicals in Serbia proper. According to a recent poll, support for SRS is as high as 38 percent in Serbia. By introducing a branch into a neighbouring country, does SRS try to prepare the future "domino effect" in case Kosovo becomes independent?