KiM Info Newsletter 16-03-06
Ambassador Dušan T. Bataković
Adviser to the President of Serbia
Serbian Negotiating Team for Kosovo and Metohija
Serb and other non-Albanian Communities in Kosovo and Metohija: Appalling Conditions and an Uncertain Future
Paper presented at the hearing in the European Parliament in Brussels, 6 March 2006, on Ethnic communities and minorities in Kosovo
The ethnic distance between various communities in Kosovo and Metohija is probably the highest not only in Serbia and Montenegro, but in the Western Balkans as a whole. The language barrier separating the two main communities—Serbs and Albanians—was additionally strengthened by religious differences, continual tradition of bitter, centuries-old ethnic rivalry, conflicting political agendas and opposing views on history in Serbia’s southern province. In addition, the tradition of violence, enhanced during the inter-ethnic armed conflicts in 1998-99, is a long-term burden which is difficult to overcome.
The situation in Kosovo and Metohija since June 1999, that is, since the arrival of the international community, at least the situation for the Serbian community in the province, resembles more that of a conflict situation than a post-conflict one. Within UN-administered Kosovo and Metohija, 257,000 non-Albanians, according to UNHCR statistics, were registered as IDPs in November 1999. Out of these 257,000, 207,000 were Serbs, with the rest being Roma, Bosniaks, Croats, Goranis, Ashkalis and so on.
Internally Displaced Persons form Kosovo and Metohija
Serbs
Serbia 207.500
Montenegro 18.500
Total 226.000
Roma
Serbia 30.000
Montenegro 7.000
Total 37.000
Muslims
Serbia 13.500
Montenegro 1.500
Total 15.000
Others
Serbia 6.500
Montenegro 2.500
Total 9.000
Total
Serbia 257.500
Montenegro 29.500
Grand total 287.000
The Albanian-dominated Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo and Metohija treat the non-Albanian population as ethnic minorities, although the Serbs are, as elsewhere in Serbia, a constituent nation, not a minority. The motivation behind the fact that the Kosovo and Metohija’s Albanians treat the Serb community as a minority is ethnic cleansing, that is, the result on the ground of ethnic cleansing. This ethnic cleansing was organized and implemented in several waves after June 1999, after the arrival of the international community. The result was that the percentage of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija has dropped from 18 to roughly 10 percent, or even less, today. The number of remaining Serbs in the north of Kosovo and Metohija (in several Serb-majority municipalities) and within KFOR-guarded, several variously sized isolated enclaves scattered throughout the province, is around 136.000. Therefore, roughly sixty percent of the Serbian population has been expelled from Kosovo and Metohija during last six years; most of them still live as IDPs in central Serbia. The actual number of registered displaced and expelled persons is 212,781 in Serbia, and 29,500 in Montenegro.
All of the province’s cities, with the exception of the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, were ethnically cleansed of Serbs in 1999, and remain so today. There are practically no Serbs living in big cities such as Priština, Prizren, Uroševac or Peć. In Priština, there were about 40,000 Serbs prior to 1999, while today there are less than a hundred of them living in a single building, under appalling conditions, constantly guarded by KFOR. The conditions in the various enclaves with respect to personal security and freedom of movement are still precarious. There is rampant unemployment and extreme poverty, while the living standards in general remain far below the average in the region and the province itself. The number of returnees, despite many promises by both UNMIK and the Albanian-dominated provisional institutions, is insignificant. So far, only 5.5 percent of the total number of Serb and non-Albanian internally displaced persons have returned to Kosovo and Metohija, almost seven years after the June 1999.
Number of returnees by years, according to UNMIK data:
The Albanian-dominated Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo and Metohija treat the non-Albanian population as ethnic minorities, although the Serbs are, as elsewhere in Serbia, a constituent nation, not a minority. The motivation behind the fact that the Kosovo and Metohija’s Albanians treat the Serb community as a minority is ethnic cleansing, that is, the result on the ground of ethnic cleansing. This ethnic cleansing was organized and implemented in several waves after June 1999, after the arrival of the international community. The result was that the percentage of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija has dropped from 18 to roughly 10 percent, or even less, today. The number of remaining Serbs in the north of Kosovo and Metohija (in several Serb-majority municipalities) and within KFOR-guarded, several variously sized isolated enclaves scattered throughout the province, is around 136.000. Therefore, roughly sixty percent of the Serbian population has been expelled from Kosovo and Metohija during last six years; most of them still live as IDPs in central Serbia. The actual number of registered displaced and expelled persons is 212,781 in Serbia, and 29,500 in Montenegro.
All of the province’s cities, with the exception of the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, were ethnically cleansed of Serbs in 1999, and remain so today. There are practically no Serbs living in big cities such as Priština, Prizren, Uroševac or Peć. In Priština, there were about 40,000 Serbs prior to 1999, while today there are less than a hundred of them living in a single building, under appalling conditions, constantly guarded by KFOR. The conditions in the various enclaves with respect to personal security and freedom of movement are still precarious. There is rampant unemployment and extreme poverty, while the living standards in general remain far below the average in the region and the province itself. The number of returnees, despite many promises by both UNMIK and the Albanian-dominated provisional institutions, is insignificant. So far, only 5.5 percent of the total number of Serb and non-Albanian internally displaced persons have returned to Kosovo and Metohija, almost seven years after the June 1999.
Number of returnees by years, according to UNMIK data:
2000 906
2001 1,453
2002 2,756
2003 3,801
2004 2,302
Total 12,218
Since 1999, the Kosovo and Metohija Serb community, as well as the Roma, Croat, Gorani and other non-Albanian ethnic communities, were the repeated targets of an organized campaign of ethnic cleansing by Albanian extremists. More than 1,300 Serbs are still missing, presumebly dead, while an additional 1,300 Serbs were killed. Thousands of ethnically motivated crimes against Serb, Roma and other non-Albanian ethnic groups were not punished, due to the almost complete absence of the rule of law in the Province. Few arrests, and fewer trials, of the perpetrators of these hate crimes have taken place. As a result, it is next to impossible to find a Serb who can express anything resembling confidence in the police and judiciary of the province. Instead, the release of each suspect in a hate crime produces the opposite effect and further marginalizes the Kosovo and Metohija Serb community.
Certainly, the number of ethnically motivated hate crimes has diminished since the March 2004 pogrom — the three day carefully orchestrated campaign of ethnic cleansing that resulted in several dozen deaths, a further exodus of Serbs from the province, thousands of arson attacks against Serbian private and commercial property, and the destruction of 35 Serbian Orthodox Church churches and monasteries. The reason is simple: the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs have largely withdrawn into their enclaves and ghettos, and rarely move outside of them into Albanian-inhabited areas. Still today, in Albanian-majority areas, the usage of the Serbian language jeopardizes one's personal security.
The property of Serb and other non-Albanian communitie—in particular in urban centers, have been usurped by local Albanians. Approximately 40,000 flats and houses are registered by UNMIK as being illegally-occupied, yet they remain so. Out of about 17,000 lawsuits concerning usurped property that have been filed by IDPs, very few have been resolved in a manner consistent with the impartial application of the rule of law.
Kosovo and Metohija contain more than 1,300 churches, monasteries, and other patrimonial sites that belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church. More than 125 churches and monasteries, one third of them listed as exceptional monuments of cultural heritage from medieval period, were destroyed by Albanian extremists after June 1999, and none or almost none of the perpetrators has been punished. In addition, more than 70 Serb graveyards that do not belong to cultural heritage and therefore are not subject to anyone’s protection have been desecrated or fully destroyed. In contrast, in areas with Serbian majority, no such example has been recorded.
The Albanian extremists are systematically destroying the Serb monasteries, churches and graveyards as inconvenient witnesses of the former and current Serb presence in the province. This represents a kind of collective tribal vengeance which targets an ethnic community. This pattern of extreme nationalism envisages the ultimate destruction of both Serb monuments and the expulsion of the Serb community as a whole. The intended result? To establish a new political reality that Serbia considers unacceptable: Kosovo and Metohija as an exclusively, ethnically-pure, Albanian land.
The economic situation for the Serb and for other non-Albanian communities is grim. UNMIK's model of privatization has, for example, legalized the discrimination of 50,000 banished workers that are also mostly internally displaced persons. Over 700,000 cadastre units have been occupied, as well as an unknown number of business facilities.
President of Serbia Boris Tadić has said on several occasions: “While Kosovo Albanians are fighting for their independence, Serbs and the other non-Albanian communities are fighting for their survival.”
The other non-Albanian communities, such as Roma, have once more become the collateral damage of an inter-ethnic conflict. In Kosovo and Metohija, they have shared the same fate as the Serbs, experiencing a real Golgotha. The percentage of expelled and displaced Roma is between 60 and 70 percent of their pre-war population in Kosovo, while present living conditions for those that remained in the province, are similar or worse than those for the Serb community, both in terms of security and of legal protection.
The Gorani, a 17,000 Muslim Slav Serbian-speaking community in the mountainous region south of Prizren, an area squeezed between Albania and Macedonia, have met with a similar fate as that of the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs and Roma. Their municipality, Gora, was administratively enlarged after June 1999 to encompass the Albanian-inhabited area of neighboring Opolje, and was consequently renamed Dragaš, in order to enhance the Albanization of the whole Gorani community. According to data provided by Gorani community, and confirmed by the UN and the OSCE, out of roughly 17,000 members of this distinct ethnic group in 1999, only 7,000 still lives in Gora, while around 10,000 of them are internally displaced persons, living mostly in Belgrade and other parts of central Serbia.
All these disturbing examples, supported by verifiable data, demonstrate that the position of the Serb community, as well as of the other non-Albanian ethnic communities in Kosovo and Metohija, remains far bellow the standards of basic human and civil rights — as the Kai Eide Report to UN confirms. The situation is unacceptable, and goes directly against the goal of maintaining a multicultural society in Kosovo. Non-Albanians are still under the strong, continual and highly discriminating pressure of extremists Albanians, deprived of basic security, individual and collective rights, legal protection and the right to maintain and further develop their cultural identity, as stressed not only by 1244 UNSC Resolution, but by the eight standards set by international community to improve the rule of law, inter-ethnic tolerance, democracy and provide for the province’s sustainable development. Thus, Kosovo and Metohija, administered since June 1999 jointly by UNMIK and Albanian-dominated Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, is still very far from basic standards needed for modern and civilized society that functions according to the most basic European values.
Within the context of negotiations on future status of the province, the substantial progress in achieving these goals for all the non-Albanian population should be given priority by the international mediators, and it should become a precondition that will precede further discussions on revising the present status of Kosovo and Metohija. The Belgrade negotiating team is therefore taking full account of the situation not only of the Serbs, but of all non-Albanian ethnic groups in drafting its proposals aimed for the improvement of their present appalling conditions and uncertain future.
Since 1999, the Kosovo and Metohija Serb community, as well as the Roma, Croat, Gorani and other non-Albanian ethnic communities, were the repeated targets of an organized campaign of ethnic cleansing by Albanian extremists. More than 1,300 Serbs are still missing, presumebly dead, while an additional 1,300 Serbs were killed. Thousands of ethnically motivated crimes against Serb, Roma and other non-Albanian ethnic groups were not punished, due to the almost complete absence of the rule of law in the Province. Few arrests, and fewer trials, of the perpetrators of these hate crimes have taken place. As a result, it is next to impossible to find a Serb who can express anything resembling confidence in the police and judiciary of the province. Instead, the release of each suspect in a hate crime produces the opposite effect and further marginalizes the Kosovo and Metohija Serb community.
Certainly, the number of ethnically motivated hate crimes has diminished since the March 2004 pogrom — the three day carefully orchestrated campaign of ethnic cleansing that resulted in several dozen deaths, a further exodus of Serbs from the province, thousands of arson attacks against Serbian private and commercial property, and the destruction of 35 Serbian Orthodox Church churches and monasteries. The reason is simple: the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs have largely withdrawn into their enclaves and ghettos, and rarely move outside of them into Albanian-inhabited areas. Still today, in Albanian-majority areas, the usage of the Serbian language jeopardizes one's personal security.
The property of Serb and other non-Albanian communitie—in particular in urban centers, have been usurped by local Albanians. Approximately 40,000 flats and houses are registered by UNMIK as being illegally-occupied, yet they remain so. Out of about 17,000 lawsuits concerning usurped property that have been filed by IDPs, very few have been resolved in a manner consistent with the impartial application of the rule of law.
Kosovo and Metohija contain more than 1,300 churches, monasteries, and other patrimonial sites that belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church. More than 125 churches and monasteries, one third of them listed as exceptional monuments of cultural heritage from medieval period, were destroyed by Albanian extremists after June 1999, and none or almost none of the perpetrators has been punished. In addition, more than 70 Serb graveyards that do not belong to cultural heritage and therefore are not subject to anyone’s protection have been desecrated or fully destroyed. In contrast, in areas with Serbian majority, no such example has been recorded.
The Albanian extremists are systematically destroying the Serb monasteries, churches and graveyards as inconvenient witnesses of the former and current Serb presence in the province. This represents a kind of collective tribal vengeance which targets an ethnic community. This pattern of extreme nationalism envisages the ultimate destruction of both Serb monuments and the expulsion of the Serb community as a whole. The intended result? To establish a new political reality that Serbia considers unacceptable: Kosovo and Metohija as an exclusively, ethnically-pure, Albanian land.
The economic situation for the Serb and for other non-Albanian communities is grim. UNMIK's model of privatization has, for example, legalized the discrimination of 50,000 banished workers that are also mostly internally displaced persons. Over 700,000 cadastre units have been occupied, as well as an unknown number of business facilities.
President of Serbia Boris Tadić has said on several occasions: “While Kosovo Albanians are fighting for their independence, Serbs and the other non-Albanian communities are fighting for their survival.”
The other non-Albanian communities, such as Roma, have once more become the collateral damage of an inter-ethnic conflict. In Kosovo and Metohija, they have shared the same fate as the Serbs, experiencing a real Golgotha. The percentage of expelled and displaced Roma is between 60 and 70 percent of their pre-war population in Kosovo, while present living conditions for those that remained in the province, are similar or worse than those for the Serb community, both in terms of security and of legal protection.
The Gorani, a 17,000 Muslim Slav Serbian-speaking community in the mountainous region south of Prizren, an area squeezed between Albania and Macedonia, have met with a similar fate as that of the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs and Roma. Their municipality, Gora, was administratively enlarged after June 1999 to encompass the Albanian-inhabited area of neighboring Opolje, and was consequently renamed Dragaš, in order to enhance the Albanization of the whole Gorani community. According to data provided by Gorani community, and confirmed by the UN and the OSCE, out of roughly 17,000 members of this distinct ethnic group in 1999, only 7,000 still lives in Gora, while around 10,000 of them are internally displaced persons, living mostly in Belgrade and other parts of central Serbia.
All these disturbing examples, supported by verifiable data, demonstrate that the position of the Serb community, as well as of the other non-Albanian ethnic communities in Kosovo and Metohija, remains far bellow the standards of basic human and civil rights — as the Kai Eide Report to UN confirms. The situation is unacceptable, and goes directly against the goal of maintaining a multicultural society in Kosovo. Non-Albanians are still under the strong, continual and highly discriminating pressure of extremists Albanians, deprived of basic security, individual and collective rights, legal protection and the right to maintain and further develop their cultural identity, as stressed not only by 1244 UNSC Resolution, but by the eight standards set by international community to improve the rule of law, inter-ethnic tolerance, democracy and provide for the province’s sustainable development. Thus, Kosovo and Metohija, administered since June 1999 jointly by UNMIK and Albanian-dominated Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, is still very far from basic standards needed for modern and civilized society that functions according to the most basic European values.
Within the context of negotiations on future status of the province, the substantial progress in achieving these goals for all the non-Albanian population should be given priority by the international mediators, and it should become a precondition that will precede further discussions on revising the present status of Kosovo and Metohija. The Belgrade negotiating team is therefore taking full account of the situation not only of the Serbs, but of all non-Albanian ethnic groups in drafting its proposals aimed for the improvement of their present appalling conditions and uncertain future.