21 March 2007

Kosovo's Back (It Never Really Left)

WEEKLY STANDARD (USA), 12/21/2006 12:00:00 AM by James G. Poulos

It's not so pristine in Pristina. That's still our problem.

REMEMBER KOSOVO? The little statelet of 2 million, still technically an "integral part" of Serbia, was the inspiration for an unprecedented NATO campaign, the first of its kind: bombing, in those less sensitive times, Christian troops on Easter. The prevention of genocide and the resulting stability of the whole Balkan region were secured, peacekeepers took up their positions in and around the capital, Pristina, and no one lived happily ever after. Serbia threw out its mad leadership--that has to count for something--but the old wounds burn even for democratic Prime Minister Kostunica, who lately termed the NATO war for Kosovo a "huge mistake, big enough for the last and this century." The occasion of these remarks? A warning of serious consequences should the West recognize Kosovar independence without a U.N. resolution.
Meanwhile, just weeks ago, U.N. police found themselves teargassing a crowd of thousands of protesting Kosovars. "Final status" for Kosovo has been on the table--and tabled--all year long. Everyone knows it has to happen but no one wants to say how. Patience is running out. The ethnic Albanians we fought to save are nationalists now, and will settle for nothing less than independence from Belgrade. The Serbs, Europe's least fortunate people, cannot abide the loss of their national homeland. But the status quo is practically untenable, too--riots and arson are on the rise and ethnic antagonists are segregating under duress. A reckoning--the final "final status"--is coming, and sooner rather than later.
So it was that Naser Rugova--head of Kosovo's Reforma party and nephew of first Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova--made the Washington rounds again this holiday season. At the Nixon Center, Rugova said he could "understand" the delay on final status, but wants us to understand that an "explosive situation" awaits the "risky calculation" of putting off Kosovars any longer. Stuck in limbo, Kosovo suffers 54 percent unemployment, with 65 percent of its population under the age of 25. Atop social problems are energy problems and, most painfully, financial problems. Kosovo needs cash, and so Rugova pitches a "normal environment for all foreign investors" as the deal for an IMF relationship and the ability to enter into "accession talks with Europe."
There's more. Rugova wants "a significant presence" maintained by the international community for the next three to five years. What the West would gain in the bargain is a stable Kosovo, secure in a "constitutional order" with a "progressive, productive, and competitive" economy. Croatia--which took 10 years to integrate into Europe--is taken as the inspiration, but Kosovo--small, landlocked, with almost zero infrastructure--has a lot of work to do, and cannot do it on its own.
 WHY WOULD WE HELP what Rugova terms this "baby nation," at the cost of infuriating Serbia? The answer may be that we have little choice. To turn away now--having exerted so much energy on Kosovo, killed so many Serbs, and touted Western policies so earnestly--is to default on every promise we have made the Kosovars.
And nothing is more attractive to the people and problems we are struggling to defeat than an imploded, aggrieved, and chaotic hinterland of Muslim and Christian admixture ringed by E.U. and NATO states. Beyond Kosovo, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania proper wait to hear from the world regarding their brethren.
The options are few, but a decision must be made eventually. Serbia is a hostage to final status as much as Kosovo. Without final status, neither country will ever see the benefits of economic membership in Europe. Serbia will remain the last pariah state west of Belarus, with a dour and draining liability on a southern border with no practical value. And Kosovo will stagnate, unable to attract investment from Belgrade and unwilling to accept its rule. Yet partition, which would shear off Kosovo's Serb fringe to facilitate a cleansed sovereignty, receives the support of neither nation. Serbs know partition means the loss of Kosovo; yet partition leaves Kosovars as the citizens of a rump state open to acrimonious border negotiation. Even neighboring Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha has gone on record against partition as encouraging "adventurers of all nationalities." "Kosovo will not be separated," agrees Rugova, who calls partition "a dangerous idea" sure to "destabilize Macedonia and Montenegro." With Belgrade intent on decentralization and Kosovo open to consociation, pushing partition does nothing to facilitate independence, the only workable final status.
IS INDEPENDENCE for Kosovo too destabilizing? Other stateless groups throughout Eurasia might revolt against their ruling regimes if Kosovo is granted independence and sovereignty. Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia--all in varying degrees of thrall to Russia--might insist upon like treatment. Nagorno-Karabakh has already moved by referendum to declare itself a "sovereign, democratic" state--with 98 percent voter approval. Russia's own Chechen problem will only look worse--a lesson not lost on China, which considers Kosovar sovereignty the worst of all precedents as far as Taiwan is concerned. (Indeed, at least some pro-independence Taiwanese draw parallels between their situation and the Kosovars'.)
But Rugova responds that Kosovo deserves special treatment on account of geography: Outside Europe, one finds "much more complicated problems." In a sense, he's right. Kosovo's situation is genuinely unique and relatively straightfoward. It's true that some work must be done to establish Kosovo's special status as a legitimate exception to legitimate rules of sovereignty--and so it should. The biggest obstacle is Russia, interested in both protecting Serb interests and drawing the line against nationalist adventures on its own southern periphery. Yet delaying final status will keep Serbia frozen out of Europe and too distant from Russia to enjoy even the cold comfort of a cozy relationship with Moscow.
It might seem callous to buy American success in Kosovo at the price of a freer Russian hand. But Kosovar independence will patch a dangerous hole in the fabric of legitimate government and the rule of law in Europe. And a simple, clear success for American foreign policy that shores up Europe has value in and of itself.
Serbs, given serious incentives, might look west more often than south. Some may even return to a Kosovo delivered from limbo. Among those incentives, a Security Council resolution will seal the deal for Kosovo but almost certainly require tacit agreements with Russia and assurances for China. If that seems a bit tart, then the alternative--Kosovo betrayed, American policy stymied, dysfunction and disorder festering in the Balkans--leaves a positively bitter taste.
James G. Poulos is an essayist and doctoral candidate at Georgetown University. His commentaries are to be found at Postmodern Conservative.